We study Bayesian mechanism design in situations where agents' information may be multi-dimensional, concentrating on mechanisms that lead to efficient allocations. Our main result is that a generalization of the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism maximizes the planner's "revenue" among all efficient mechanisms. This result is then used to study multiple object auctions in situations where bidders have privately known "demand curves" and extended to include situations with complementarities across objects or externalities across bidders. We also illustrate how the main result may be used to analyze the possibility of allocating both private and public goods efficiently when budget balance considerations are important. The generalized VCG mechanism, therefore, serves to unify many results in mechansim design theory.
Introduction
Mechanism design theory now forms an integral part of modern economics.
1 Its varied applications include the theory of monopoly pricing, optimal tax theory and the provision of public goods. Perhaps its most successful application has been to the theory of auctions, a central theme of this paper. With a few exceptions, however, mechanism design theory in general, and auction theory in particular, to date has * We thank the Koret Foundation and the National Science Foundation for research support and the Center for Rationality at the Hebrew University for its hospitality. We are grateful to S. Hart for his generous help and encouragement and to P. Reny for many useful discussions. We have also benefited from the comments of J.-P. Benoît, T. Gresik, J. Morgan and R. Rosenthal. 1 For instance, see the extensive and unified account of mechanism design theory in Mas-Colell et al. (1995) . This is also an excellent source for references. restricted attention to the case when agents' private information is one dimensional. Consideration of multi-dimensional types poses substantial technical difficulties and results of any generality seem to be non-existent. The complications are not of a technical nature alone: many of the economic insights from the single-dimensional theory do not extend in any natural fashion. (See Armstrong (1996) , McAfee and McMillan (1988) and Wilson (1993) ).
An important strand of traditional mechanism design theory is concerned with the design of optimal mechanisms (or auctions), that is, mechanisms/auctions which maximize the expected revenue of the seller (Myerson (1981) , Wilson (1993) , among others). A second strand of the theory, however, is concerned with the design of efficient mechanisms (Vickrey (1961) , Mirrlees (1971) , Groves (1973) , among others).
Here the primary objective of the planner is not revenue maximization but rather social efficiency.
Our approach combines the two considerations, placing greater weight on efficiency. We are interested in revenue maximizing mechanisms but restrict attention to mechanisms that allocate efficiently. Our main result derives the revenue maximizing mechanism (or auction) in the class of efficient mechanisms (auctions): this is a generalization of the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism. Thus while optimal auctions are difficult to characterize when types are multi-dimensional, we are able to make progress in this area by focusing on efficient mechanisms and are able to extend the extant theory to multi-dimensional types.
With this characterization in hand, we can then address a variety of other questions. For instance, we show that budget balancing mechanisms exist if and only if the generalized VCG mechanism runs an expected surplus for the planner.
The fact that the generalized VCG provides a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of balanced budget efficient mechanism results in simple and unified proofs of some impossibility results concerning (a) efficient bilateral trade; and (b) efficient provision of public goods.
Our set up is abstract. The abstraction leads to a simple formulation and also has the virtue that most of our results are then derived in a very general setting. For example, in the context of multiple object auctions we make very weak assumptions on the structure of the valuations of the bidders. In particular, our results are applicable in situations of non-identical goods with complementarities, issues that have been the focus of much recent attention in auction theory.
The analysis of multiple object auctions forms both a major motivation for this paper and a major area of application of the results.
Multiple Object Auctions and Privatization: Although Vickrey's (1961) classic paper on auctions was concerned with the question of efficiency, starting with Myerson (1981) , auction theory has primarily been occupied with the question of revenue. Attempts to extend Myerson's beautiful results to the case of multiple objects have been largely unsuccessful. Indeed, in order make the problem tractable, most of the research in this area has made the assumption that even with multiple objects the private information of the buyers is still one dimensional (Wilson (1979) , Maskin and Riley (1990) , Ausubel and Cramton (1995) , Branco (1996) among others).
The recent spurt in interest in the study of multiple object auctions is largely the result of large scale privatization of socially held assets by governments. These include the sales of industrial enterprises in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, radio spectra in the United States and the railway system in Britain. There is a vast literature in this area. Recent work on the theoretical aspects of privatization includes Maskin (1992) , McMillan (1994) and Milgrom (1997) .
The primary goal of these privatizations is not the maximization of revenue but rather that the assets being sold are allocated efficiently. Of course, because of the vast sums involved the revenue question is not without interest but it does seem to be of secondary import.
Why should efficiency be the primary goal of privatization? It may be argued that governments should not be concerned about efficiency at all since there is likely to be secondary market for these assets and that transactions in these secondary markets will in the end result in an efficient allocation. Thus, following this line of argument, governments may as well maximize revenue and not worry about how the assets are allocated.
However, because of the nature and size of the assets being privatized, secondary trades are likely to be the result of bilateral (or possibly multilateral) bargaining rather than from trade on well functioning thick markets. And this bargaining will take place under conditions of incomplete information. But it is well understood that bargaining under incomplete information is unlikely to lead to efficient trade (as shown by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) , for instance). Thus, it may be argued that in order to ensure that the assets are allocated efficiently, the government cannot rely on secondary markets.
Indeed, in the well publicized sale of radio spectra in the United States, the Federal Communications Commission was specifically mandated by Congress to sell the licenses in a way that ensured an "efficient and intensive use of the electromagnetic spectrum." The designers of the auction rules interpreted this as "putting licenses in the hands of those who value them the most," (Milgrom (1997) ). Revenue issues, while not entirely absent, played a subsidiary role at best.
It is well-known that the twin goals of optimality (revenue maximization) and social efficiency (welfare maximization) may be in conflict. For instance, consider the design of an optimal auction for a single good as in Myerson (1981) . First, the optimal auction allocates the object to the agent with the highest "priority level" (see Myerson (1981) ) and since this is not necessarily the person who assigns the highest value to the object, the allocation may be inefficient. Second, even in cases where the ranking according to priority levels agrees with the ranking according to values, the optimal auction typically involves a reserve price. Now with positive probability the seller retains the object even though there are unrealized gains from trade. Thus the optimal auction need not be socially efficient.
The Main Results: Our paper derives the following results in the context of independent multi-dimensional types and quasi-linear preferences:
1. Revenue Maximization: Our main result is that a generalized version of the wellknown Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism maximizes the planners' expected revenue among all efficient mechanisms (Theorem 1 below) that are incentive compatible and individually rational. This result is derived in a very general context.
Multiple Object Auctions:
We show how the main result may be applied to multiple object auctions. In situations where the objects are identical and bidders have decreasing marginal valuations ("downward sloping demand curves") it implies that the Vickrey (1961) auction maximizes the seller's revenue among all auctions that are efficient (Proposition 1). We then show how our abstract set up can also accommodate, very simply, non-identical objects, complementarities ("synergies") among the objects and consumption externalities.
Budget Balance:
Even though the VCG mechanism typically does not balance the planner's budget, we show that there exists an efficient, incentive compatible and individually rational mechanism that also balances the budget if and only if the generalized VCG mechanism runs an expected surplus (Theorem 2). The proof is constructive.
Other Applications:
The result on necessary and sufficient conditions for budget balance is applied to two allocation problems, one with private goods and one with public goods. It leads to very elementary proofs of (a) the impossibility of an efficient trade of a single object among a buyer and a seller (Proposition 2); and (b) the impossibility of efficient provision and financing of a public project (Proposition 3).
Our analysis depends crucially on a technical result which shows that any two incentive compatible mechanisms which implement the same allocation rule must be "payoff equivalent," that is, the expected payoff to an agent can differ in the two mechanisms by at most an additive constant (Lemma 1 below). This result is thus a generalization of Myerson's (1981) payoff equivalence result to the case of when agents' private information is multi-dimensional. It is derived without making any differentiability assumptions on the mechanism and is thus applicable to situations (e.g., auctions) where such assumptions are not natural. The proof of Lemma 1 is relegated to an appendix.
Preliminaries
There is a set K of a finite number of social alternatives. Suppose that K = {1, 2, ..., K} with generic element k. There are I individual agents, indexed i = 1, 2, ..., I.
Each agent i then has a K-dimensional type t i = (t i (1) , t i (2) , ..., t i (K)) ∈ R K . The payoff to agent i of type t i is quasi-linear, that is, it is of the form
where x i is a monetary transfer made by i to a planner or a central agency. Let T i denote the set of possible types for i. We assume that for all i, T i is a compact and convex subset of R K . For example, in a problem of how to allocate a finite number of indivisible objects, the alternatives may represent allocations of the objects to the individuals and the type of an agent may represent how much value or utility the agent derives from the various alternatives. Notice that the abstract model is general enough to allow for a variety of specifications including complementarities among goods and externalities among agents.
As usual, the vector t = (t 1 , t 2 , ..., t I ) denotes the types of all agents and the vector
.., t I ) the types of all agents other than i. Correspondingly, T = × I j=1 T j and T −i = × j =i T j denote the sets of all types and all types other than i,
Let f i denote the density of t i on T i . We suppose that f i is continuous and that the support of f i , denoted by supp f i , is T i . The types t i are assumed to be independently distributed across agents.
The environment considered here is thus one of independent "private values."
Mechanisms: A direct mechanism is a pair (κ, µ) where κ : T → K is an allocation rule and µ : T → R I is a payment rule. Thus, given reports s ∈ T, κ (s) is the chosen alternative and µ i (s) is the transfer payment made by i. A mechanism (κ, µ) is said to be (Bayesian) incentive compatible if the identity function ("truth-telling") is a Bayesian equilibrium of the resulting game. By the revelation principle, the restriction to direct mechanisms will be without loss of generality.
Let ∆ (K) denote the set of probability distributions over K. Given an allocation rule κ :
that is, the conditional probability that alternative k will be chosen by κ (·) when agent i's type is t i .
Although we have assumed that the allocation rule κ : T → K is deterministic it would make no difference in what follows if it were random, that is, κ : T → ∆ (K) . In that case, Q k i (t i ) would again be defined as before but its computation would incorporate the randomness of the allocation rule also.
In much of what follows, we will fix an allocation rule κ (·) and thus, in order to economize on notation, suppress the dependence of
Given a mechanism, the expected payoff to agent i from reporting s i when his type is t i and all other agents are reporting truthfully is
where
is the expected payment of i when reporting s i . It is convenient to define the equilibrium payoff function
It may be useful to think of U i as an indirect utility function. Once again, in order to economize on notation, we suppress the dependence of U i on the specific mechanism (κ, µ) and write
Our first result, Lemma 1 below, provides a characterization of the equilibrium payoff functions U i that can result from an incentive compatible mechanism. It shows that the equilibrium payoff functions from two such mechanisms with the same allocation rule κ (·) can differ at most by an additive constant. It is a generalization of the "revenue equivalence" result (Myerson (1981) ) and Riley and Samuelson (1981) to the case of multi-dimensional types. Under stronger hypotheses, the conclusion of Lemma 1 has been obtained by for general allocation rules by Armstrong (1996) and Jeheil et al. (1996) , and for the particular case of efficient rules, by d'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1979b) and Williams (1997)
Proof. See the Appendix.
which just states that all incentive compatible mechanisms with the same allocation rule κ (·) are also "revenue (or payment) equivalent" up to an additive constant. Until now our analysis has been fairly standard and followed conventional mechanism design theory. In what follows our concern shifts to efficient mechanisms.
Efficient Mechanisms
We now examine properties of incentive compatible mechanisms such that the allocation rule is socially efficient.
Since agents' payoffs are quasi-linear, an allocation rule is socially efficient if and only if the chosen alternative maximizes the sum of agents' payoffs.
Definition 1 An allocation rule
We call any mechanism (κ * , µ) with an efficient allocation rule κ * (·) an efficient mechanism.
It is convenient to define
as the maximized value of social welfare from an efficient allocation when the types are t, and
as the social welfare of individuals other than i from an efficient allocation when the types are t.
Participation Constraints
Thus far we have concentrated on incentive compatibility, implicitly assuming that all agents participate in the workings of the mechanism, that is, provide their private information, t, and pay µ (t) . In many applications, however, it is natural to assume that agents have outside options and that if their expected payoff from the mechanism is not superior to their outside option, agents can choose to not participate in the workings of the mechanism. Exercising their option to not participate in the mechanism may violate social efficiency. For instance, consider the problem of allocating a single indivisible good by means of an auction. If there is an individual i whose interim expected payoff from participating is worse than his outside option he will not participate in the auction. Now, ex post, there will be instances where i has the highest valuation and the socially efficient allocation would be to award i the object. However, this fact cannot be determined since his private information, t i , is not available to the planner.
Thus, in such situations an efficient mechanism must guarantee that individuals will not be worse off by participating in the mechanism. This constrains the range of feasible mechanisms.
In many situations it is simplest to model this by assuming that every agent's payoff from not participating is 0. This may be appropriate, for instance, when considering the auction of a privately consumed good with no consumption externalities. In other situations, however, it is more appropriate to model the payoff from not participating as itself being type dependent (and hence private information). For instance, in an allocation problem where one of the agents is a producer of some goods the decision to participate may depend on the cost of production itself, that is, on the "type" of the agent.
We will suppose that the "break-even" expected payoff of agent i is exogenously given by a continuous function
Our specification is general enough to allow for the possibility that IR i also depends on the allocation rule κ * . This may be the result of externalities exerted by participants on non-participants. As an example, suppose that a valuable technology is being allocated to one of the firms in an industry by means of an auction. Since how this technology is allocated will affect competition among all firms in the industry, including those that choose not to participate in the auction, the underlying allocation rule may affect the expected payoff from not participating.
An extensive treatment of auctions with externalities and a discussion of participation constraints in such an environment can be found in Jeheil et. al (1996) .
The VCG Mechanism and a Generalization
In this section we study the properties of a well-known mechanism due to Vickrey (1961) and Clarke (1971) . We then provide a generalization.
The VCG Mechanism
In his pioneering study of auctions Vickrey (1961) introduced a mechanism to efficiently allocate L identical multiple objects in a context where each bidder has declining marginal values for the objects (or in other words, a downward sloping demand function). In the Vickrey auction each of I ≥ 2 bidders submits L bids in decreasing order and the lth bid represents the marginal amount the bidder is willing to pay for the lth object. Out of the I ×L bids the L highest bids are awarded objects and of course, I × (L − 1) bids are rejected. If bidder i gets l i objects, he is asked to pay the l i highest rejected bids that are not his own. Vickrey (1961) showed that in his auction it was a weakly dominant strategy to bid one's vector of marginal values honestly and as a result the auction was efficient.
Subsequently, in his analysis of the efficient provision of public goods, Clarke (1971) introduced the so called "pivotal mechanism" that leads to an efficient allocation in that context. Clarke (1971) showed that in the pivotal mechanism it was a dominant strategy to report one's value of the public good honestly and the mechanism was efficient.
These mechanisms were later generalized by Groves (1973) . The Vickrey (1961) auction and the Clark (1971) pivotal mechanism are, in fact, just special cases of a single abstract mechanism that we will refer to as the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (or VCG) mechanism.
The VCG mechanism, denoted by κ * , µ V , is defined by the payment rule:
where κ * (0, t −i ) is an efficient alternative that would result if i were to report t i = 0 (or equivalently, in many settings, if i were not present).
Observe that the amount µ V i (t) represents the externality that i exerts on the other I − 1 agents by his presence in society. It is the difference between the welfare of the others "without him" and the welfare of the others "with him." Notice that in both the Vickrey (1961) auction for private goods and the Clarke (1971) mechanism for public goods each agent pays the externality he exerts on the other I − 1 agents.
Fix some t −i , the types of agents other than i. In the VCG mechanism the payoff to i of type t i when he reports s i is:
The second term is independent of the report s i and the first is maximized by choosing s i = t i . Thus, as is well known, "truth-telling" is a weakly dominant strategy in the VCG mechanism. Thus, a fortiori, the VCG mechanism is incentive compatible. Using (9) agent i's ex post payoff in equilibrium (when
, that is, the difference in social welfare when i reports t i versus when he reports 0.
The Generalized VCG Mechanism
The payment in the VCG mechanism is exactly the externality that i exerts on other agents from reporting t i rather than zero (see (8) ). In this subsection we use this interpretation to generalize the original VCG mechanism. This generalization will play a central role in our analysis.
Fix a vector of types s = (s 1 , s 2 , ..., s n ) ∈ T, one for each player. The VCG mechanism with basis s, is defined by
It is routine to verify that truth-telling is a weakly dominant strategy in the generalized VCG mechanism and thus it is also incentive compatible. Agent i's ex post payoff in equilibrium is
which is just the difference in social welfare that would result if i were to report t i rather than s i plus the individually rational level of type s i . The corresponding expected payoff is
Observe that if for all i, we have s i = 0 and IR i (s i ) = 0, then the VCG mechanism with basis s i defined in (10) is the same as the original VCG mechanism in (8).
Optimal Choice of Basic Types
We have defined the VCG mechanism relative to any basis s. In what follows it will be important to choose s optimally. Define
and consider the mechanism µ * (t | t i ), that is, the VCG mechanism with basis t. The type t i is the "most reluctant" type of agent i in the sense that his gain from participating in any VCG mechanism is the least among all types of agent i.
Using (11) we can write:
Next, using (12), we can write, for all t i ,
and by rearranging (13) we obtain that
so that the mechanism µ * (· | t) is individually rational. To summarize, we have argued that for a VCG mechanism with basis t = (t 1 , t 2 , ..., t n ) defined in (12) we have that for all t i ,
Payment Maximizing Efficient Mechanisms
Our main result is: 
Individual rationality requires that for all i, U
i (t i ) ≥ IR i (t i ) = U * i (t i | t i ) and con- sequently, for all t i , U i (t i ) ≥ U * i (t i | t i ) .
Thus, for all
Thus the VCG mechanism with basis t maximizes the expected payment of the agents.
It is worthwhile to note that in the class of efficient Bayesian mechanisms the revenue maximizing mechanism has a dominant strategy equilibrium. 4 In general, in order to compute the optimal basis, t, as in (12), the planner needs to know the distribution of types f i . In many natural applications, however, knowledge of f i may be unnecessary. For example, if, as often assumed in auction theory, T i = R K + and IR i (t i ) = 0 then regardless of the density f i , t i = 0.
Multiple Object Auctions
In this section we illustrate how the main result of the previous section (Theorem 1) may be applied to study auctions of multiple objects in the original environment studied by Vickrey (1961) .
Suppose that there are K identical objects to be auctioned and each bidder has a downward sloping "demand curve" which is privately known. Let t i (k) ≥ 0 denote the marginal value of the kth object assigned by bidder i of type t i . Thus if i were to obtain L objects the total value would be L k=1 t i (k) . It is natural to call the vector t i the "demand curve" of bidder i. The set of types T i is then just the set of possible downward sloping demand curves so that
Suppose further that each bidder's payoff from not participating in the auction is 0.
Clearly, in this environment the types t i = 0,and thus the VCG mechanism with basis t is exactly the auction proposed by Vickrey (1961).
5
The following result on multiple object auctions is an immediate consequence of Theorem 1:
Proposition 1 (Revenue Maximization) Suppose all bidders have downward sloping demand curves. The Vickrey auction maximizes the expected revenue of the seller among all auctions that are efficient, incentive compatible and individually rational.
While Proposition 1 applies to the environment originally studied by Vickrey (1961) , Theorem 1 is applicable to a more general class of auction problems. For instance, in the case of identical objects it applies not only when individual demand curves are downward sloping but even when they are not. Moreover, Theorem 1 applies as well to situations when the objects are not necessarily identical and even allows for the possibility that there are complementarities (or synergies) in consumption. Indeed, it is general enough to accommodate externalities in consumption across bidders. This is because in our abstract set up a particular social alternative, k, can denote a complete allocation of the objects to bidders and a particular bidder may then be sensitive to how the objects are allocated to his rivals. Finally, we have allowed for the possibility that the participation constraints are type dependent.
Budget Balance
In many economic problems a desideratum of a mechanism is that for every realization of types, the transfers from agents sum to zero, that is, the planner's budget is exactly balanced ex post. In our notation, a mechanism is said to balance the budget if for all t,
We know from the work of Green and Laffont (1977) that no dominant strategy mechanism can always balance the budget. However, Arrow (1979) and d'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1979a) independently showed that there do exist Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms with the balanced budget property.
The Arrow (1979) and d'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1979a) (or AGV) mechanism (also called the "expected externality" mechanism) κ * , µ A is defined by
so that for all t,
To see that the AGV mechanism is incentive compatible note that the expected payoff to i from reporting s i when his type is t i when all other agents are reporting truthfully is:
and since the second term is independent of s i , this is maximized by setting s i = t i . It is easy to see that the AGV mechanism may not satisfy the individual rationality constraint. The question of whether there are efficient, incentive compatible, individually rational mechanisms which also balance the budget can also be answered by means of the VCG mechanism.
Theorem 2 There exists an efficient, incentive compatible and individually rational mechanism that balances the budget if and only if the VCG mechanism with basis t results in an expected surplus, that is, if and only if
Proof. The fact that (16) is necessary follows from Theorem 1 above: if the VCG mechanism with basis t runs a deficit then all efficient, incentive compatible and individually rational mechanisms must run a deficit.
We now show that (16) is sufficient by explicitly constructing a mechanism that balances the budget and is individually rational. First, consider the AGV mechansim µ A defined in (15) . From Lemma 1 we know that there exist constants c A i such that:
Now consider the VCG mechanism with basis t,
Again, from Lemma 1 we know that there exist constants c * i such that
Next, suppose the VCG mechanism with basis t runs an expected surplus, that is,
Then we have that
since the right hand side is exactly 0.
Equivalently,
Clearly, µ balances the budget. It is also incentive compatible since the payoff to each agent in the mechanism µ differs from the payoff from an incentive compatible mechanism, µ A , by a constant. It remains to verify that µ is individually rational. (17) that
and thus
so that µ is also individually rational.
Corollary 1 If for all i, IR i ≡ 0 and all t i ≥ 0 then there exists an efficient, incentive compatible and individually rational mechanism that balances the budget.
Under these assumptions, for each i, t i = 0 and thus the VCG mechanism with basis 0 is
Thus the VCG mechanism with basis 0 always runs a surplus and the result follows from Theorem 2.
Consider the problem of allocating a bundle of private goods among a group of agents in a way that ensures budget balance. For instance, a bundle of scarce resources may need to be efficiently allocated among the divisions of a company. While an auction will accomplish this task there may be situations where a balanced budget mechanism is more natural. Corollary 1 implies that such a mechanism always exists. Indeed, such a mechanism is constructed explicitly in the proof of Theorem 2.
Inefficiency Results
The revenue maximization result (Theorem 1 above) shows that the expected payments in the VCG mechanism m * i (t i ) are an upper bound to the expected payments from any efficient and individually rational mechanism. In this section we illustrate how this result may be applied in two settings that are very different from that of an auction.
Bilateral Trade
First, we show that the inefficiency result of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) follows rather simply as a consequence of the revenue maximization result.
Consider a situation of trade between a seller (agent 1) and a buyer (agent 2). There is a single indivisible good owned by the seller. There is also a divisible good, money, and as usual, payoffs are quasi-linear. Let the set of alternatives be K = {1, 2} where k = 1 denotes that there is no trade and the seller keeps the good whereas k = 2 denotes that there is trade and the buyer gets the object.
The seller's set of types is T 1 = [0, 1] × {0} and the buyer's set of types is T 2 = {0} × [0, 1] . A seller of type t 1 will not participate unless he gets at least his payoff from no trade and thus IR 1 (t 1 ) = t 1 (1) . For the buyer IR 2 (t 2 ) = 0 for all t 2 ∈ T 2 .
Clearly, from the definition of efficiency κ
Now clearly from (12), we have that t 1 = (1, 0) and t 2 = (0, 0) . A trading mechanism is a mechanism (κ, µ) where for each t ∈ T, κ (t) is an allocation and µ i (t) are payments satisfying µ 1 (t) + µ 2 (t) = 0. Thus a trading mechanism is a mechanism in which there in no net inflow or outflow of funds and the planner's budget is balanced.
As in Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) we ask whether there exists a trading mechanism that is individually rational and promotes efficient trade among the agents. Denote by κ * (t) the allocation that is efficient when the types are t. We know that the VCG mechanism with basis t, (κ * , µ * (· | t)) is efficient. Let us now compute the payments by the two agents in the VCG mechanism with basis t. It is easy to see that if
and is strictly less than zero unless the no-trade is itself efficient. Thus the VCG mechanism with basis t runs an expected deficit. From Theorem 2, we infer that no individually rational mechanism will promote efficient trade unless the mechanism injects money into the economy, that is, it cannot be a trading mechanism. 6 Thus we obtain: Proposition 2 In the bilateral trading problem there does not exist an efficient, incentive compatible and individually rational trading mechanism.
Williams (1997) also provides an alternative derivation of the Myerson and Satterthwaite result which is closely related. In particular, he shows an equivalence between any efficient mechanism and one in the Groves class; and that no Groves mechanism can satisfy individual rationality and balance the budget simultaneously. He then uses an equivalence result to analyze both the possiblity and impossibility of efficient trade, especially in situations that involve many agents. McAfee (1991) and Makowski and Mezzetti (1994) also use similar techniques.
These papers, however, do not identify the salience of the VCG mechanism.
Public Project Choice
Next, consider the classic public goods problem. Suppose that a public good can be either provided or not. Thus the set of social alternatives is K = {0, 1}. Let t i ≥ 0 denote agent i's utility from the public good so that for each individual,
Suppose that for all i and t i , IR i (t i ) = 0 so that t i = 0. Suppose that it costs c to produce the public good. It is efficient to undertake the project (k = 1) if and only if
It is known that in no dominant strategy mechanism (such as a VCG mechanism) can the cost of the public good exactly equal the payments of the agents. In other words, in such mechanisms the budget cannot be balanced. The AGV mechanism proposed by Arrow (1979) and d'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1979a) satisfies the budget balancing property but need not be individually rational. Mailath and Postlewaite (1991) show that no mechanism that balances the budget can be individually rational. 6 For the sake of exposition we have assumed that the supports of the values of the seller and the buyer are the same. It is routine to confirm that the result continues to hold as long as the supports overlap (as in Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) ). 7 Laffont and Maskin (1979) also allude to the difficulty of achieving interim individual rationality and demonstrate the possibility of achieving ex ante individual rationality, that is,
To see how this last result is also a consequence of Theorem 2 let us, once again, compute the payments in the VCG mechanism. We have that the externality exerted by i on the other I − 1 agents is, in the usual notation:
and thus µ * i (t) > 0 only if κ * (t −i ) = 0 and κ * (t) = 1, that is, only if i is "pivotal." Now, when µ *
If with positive probability, it is strictly better to provide the good than not, then the expected payment in VCG mechanism is less than c. Since the VCG mechanism maximizes expected payments among all efficient and individually rational mechanisms we obtain:
Proposition 3 Suppose that with positive probability, it is strictly better to provide the public good than not. Then there does not exist an efficient and individually rational mechanism which always covers the cost of producing the public good.
Conclusion
We have shown how a single mechanism, the VCG mechanism with an optimally chosen basis, provides a unified perspective on many areas of mechanism design theory. It raises the greatest revenue among auctions that result in an efficient allocation of multiple objects. It also serves to determine the possibility of achieving efficiency when other considerations (e.g. budget balance) are present.
Appendix
In this appendix we derive some consequences of incentive compatibility. Our goal is to provide a proof for the payoff equivalence result (Lemma 1).
Definition 3
The direct mechanism (κ, µ) is incentive compatible if for all i and for all t i , s i ∈ T i :
First, observe that incentive compatibility is equivalent to the statement that for all t i and s i in supp f i (which is assumed to be T i ):
By interchanging the roles of t i and s i in (19) we also have
and together (19) and (20) yield:
Second, observe that incentive compatibility can be rewritten as:
For each s i , the expression in the brackets is an affine function of t i and since the maximum of a family of affine functions is a convex function, U i is convex (Rochet (1987) Royden (1968) ) and thus it is differentiable almost everywhere (with respect to Lebesgue measure) in the interior of its domain. Furthermore, every absolutely continuous function is the integral of its derivative (Theorem 5.13 in Royden (1968) ) and so we have:
Now suppose r ∈ (0, 1) is such that V i is differentiable at r. From (20) :
If δ > 0 then we get:
and taking the limit as δ ↓ 0 we obtain that V i (r) ≥ Q i (rt i + (1 − r) s i ) · (t i − s i ) .
On the other hand, if δ < 0 we get the opposite inequality, and taking the limit as δ ↑ 0 we obtain that V i (r) ≤ Q i (rt i + (1 − r) s i ) · (t i − s i ) . Thus if V i is differentiable at r ∈ (0, 1) ,
Now substituting in (22) we obtain that for all t i ∈ T i :
Thus at any point in T i , U i is determined by Q i up to an additive constant. This completes the proof.
If U i were differentiable everywhere then from (21) we would have ∇U i = Q i . In that case U i would be a potential of the vector field Q i and because the line integral of a function with a potential is path independent (Apostol (1969)) we could write: Consider an efficient allocation rule κ * , that is, for all t, κ * (t) ∈ arg max t 1 (k) + t 2 (k) and suppose that the payment functions are µ i (t) = −t j (κ * (t)) where j = i. The mechanism (κ * , µ) is incentive compatible (truth-telling is a dominant strategy) but if min {t 2 (2) , t 2 (3)} > 1, U 2 (t 2 ) = max {t 2 (2) , t 2 (3)} and thus U 2 is not differentiable at any t 2 such that t 2 (2) = t 2 (3) > 1.
Also note that in the example above, the resulting Q 2 is discontinuous at any t 2 such that t 2 (2) = t 2 (3) > 1.
We emphasize that Lemma 1, is derived without making any assumptions about the differentiability of U i and thus applies even to the example given above.
Finally, we point out that the assumption that the set of types T i is convex (and that supp f i = T i ) plays an important role in Lemma 1.
